Individual vessel quotas (IVQs) established on an important target species are a common tool to regulate fisheries. This article investigates fishermen's behavior in a situation in which a primary output quota is decreasing due to policy restrictions. The findings suggest that vessels respond to such situations by increasing pressure on unregulated species, using their spare capacity. This article models fishermen's behavior using a restricted profit function, treating the harvest of regulated species as fixed, while unregulated species are variable outputs. An empirical application is provided for the Polish trawler fleet with permits to harvest IVQ-regulated Atlantic Cod in the Baltic Sea. The results indicate a strong substitute relationship between the cod quota and pelagic species. Derived elasticities of intensity, providing a measure of the impact of a fixedfactor on variable factors, offer strong evidence of increasing pressure on pelagic species caused by decreasing quotas.

JEL Code: Q22.

The potential gains from a regulatory change allowing for reallocation of marketable nitrogen emission permits under a cap and trade system are analyzed in a dynamic context using Data Envelopment Analysis to formulate linear programming models. In these models new, more environmental friendly farms are gradually introduced to the industry over 10 years. The new industry structure, production, and profitability gains are investigated, and the effect of changing the overall level of nitrogen emission is analyzed. Our results show that there is scope for a more efficient allocation of resources to either increase the production level or to reduce the emission level. This article adds to the literature by extending previous static reallocation models to a dynamic model, which allows for a gradual introduction of new firms. This makes it possible for managers to analyze the effects of reallocating production across firms and time.

JEL Codes: Q22, Q28, D62.

Confidence intervals for regional economic impacts resulting from changes in saltwater sportfishing harvest limits are calculated using a stated preference model of sportfishing participation and a social accounting matrix (SAM) for southern Alaska. Confidence intervals are constructed to account for two types of input variation in impact estimates—sample variation in sportfishing-related expenditures and stochastic variation from parameters in the recreation participation model. For five of six policy scenarios examined, estimated impacts are not statistically different from zero. Tests for differences in estimated impacts between scenarios show that no statistical differences are found whenever stochastic variation is considered (statistical differences occur only when sample variation alone is accounted for). Due to the lack of statistical differences in this case, a comparison of economic impacts does not provide a clear-cut preferred alternative, and consequently other economic and non-economic criteria for evaluating policy scenarios should bear greater weight in policy decisions.

JEL Codes: R11, Q51, Q22, Q58.

Atlantic cod (Gadus morhua) has been culturally important in the northeast United States (US) for hundreds of years. This research estimates a hedonic model of cod prices in the Northeast US from 2005–2011. While large fish typically receive premium prices, the largest cod receive prices that are approximately $0.20 per pound lower than fish in the next largest market category. A moderate premium for freshness is found: cod caught on trips that last four days receive $0.04 less per pound than fish that is caught on shorter trips. This discount rises to nearly $0.15 per pound for trips lasting 10 days or longer. A similar discount exists for fish that are stored for two or more days after landing. The premia estimated by the hedonic price model are quite different from the group mean premia, suggesting that bioeconomic models that incorporate price heterogeneity should consider more sophisticated price models.

JEL Codes: Q22, Q50, D40.

Commercial traditional linefish snoek reaches consumers through retail outlets supplied by large hawkers and processors or directly through small hawkers. While the former channel caters to middle- to hlgh-income consumers, the latter mainly services low-income consumers. Retail outlets govern the first chain, while fishers believe hawkers are the lead actors in the second chain based on the thinking that they have a monopoly on the selling of snoek in townships. The real reason most fishers do not practice forward integration, though, is the impracticality of extending value chain functions beyond catching. Three suggestions are put forward for improving the value chain position for fishers: making crew members rights holders in their own right; forward integration into retailing and delivery contracts with processors and fish shops; and/ or direct supply contracts with supermarkets. All these options would require government policy intervention and financial and technical backing for fishers.

JEL Code: Q21.