In this article, intraseasonal fishing is modeled as a differential game between fishers in a total allowable catch (TAC)–regulated fishery with and without individual fishing quotas (IFQs). Heterogeneous harvest values are included by incorporating time-specific harvest costs and a cumulative-harvest effect into fishers' profit functions. I also allow for strategic interaction among fishers via ex-vessel price dynamics. The equilibrium harvest strategies of the differential games are solved numerically through the use of a genetic algorithm. It is demonstrated how different harvesting sector environments lead to varying degrees of ex-vessel price increases when IFQs are implemented. The primary result shows that possible margins for competition among fishers, other than competition for a greater share of the TAC, can exist even under IFQ management and this competition, especially when combined with noncompetitive processors, may be substantial enough to prevent sizeable rent transfers from the processing sector to the harvesting sector.

JEL Classification Codes: Q22, C73, C61

This article characterizes anticipated changes in fleet structure, vessel harvesting activity, and economic performance in the Pacific Coast groundfish fishery under an individual fishing quota management program. Results suggest that the current fleet of 117 vessels will be reduced by roughly 50%–66% to 40–-60 vessels, resulting in annual cost savings of $18–$22 million (based on 2004 price and cost estimates). However, cost savings could be significantly less if restrictions on quota trading across vessels are incorporated into the program design. Alternative modes of collecting fees to fund program administration and their impact on fleet size and total fishery value are also studied. We conclude that a program of individual fishing quotas, if carefully designed, can be an attractive alternative for management of the Pacific Coast groundfish fishery.

JEL Classification Codes: Q2, D24

Despite decades of rebuilding efforts, the population of oysters in the Chesapeake Bay has fallen to historically low levels. We develop a novel bioeconomic model which includes the value of ecological services provided by oysters in situ to determine the optimal length of a harvest moratorium and a subsequent harvest rate that will maximize the net present value of the oyster resource. Not surprisingly, steady-state stocks and optimal harvest rates are increasing and decreasing in ecological service values, respectively. The results also suggest that instituting a harvest moratorium and limiting harvest effort in the fishery can increase the net present value of the resource more than effort limitation alone.

JEL Classification Codes: Q22, Q57, H41

Social interaction and crowding are reported to be important determinants of recreational outdoor activities. As both are determined by the total number of simultaneous participants in the recreational activity, the effect of increasing the number of participants is generally ambiguous. An analogue to Leibenstein's (1950) bandwagon and snob effect in demand is presented, and these theoretical models are extended to allow for different congestion effects at different congestion levels. Empirical evidence from a contingent valuation (CV) study on Norwegian recreational Atlantic salmon fishing demonstrates that the crowding effect dominates the social interaction effect for all levels of congestion. Moreover, the marginal crowding effect is found to be diminishing.

JEL Classification Codes: Q21, Q22, Q26

The Chilean salmon farming industry is currently facing unprecedented economic losses related to the infectious salmon anemia (ISA) disease. Production of Atlantic salmon is being reduced from almost 400,000 tonnes in 2005 to an estimated 100,000 tonnes in 2010. The spread of and response to the disease raises a number of important issues with respect to the actions of the companies involved as well as the regulatory body. It is particularly interesting that adequate measures have not been implemented in Chile, as the species is farmed in relatively few countries and, as such, is fairly transparent. Moreover, all other major salmon- producing countries have experienced the disease, and several of the largest companies in Chile are multinationals with first-hand experience with ISA from other countries.

JEL Classification Codes: K32, Q22